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Reading texts is less valued today than it once was. This is noticeable in various ways. 
Colleagues, especially from the other side of the Atlantic, tell that detailed philological 
work is next to useless for furthering their careers. It is perhaps assumed that everyone 
with a knowledge of the language concerned can read a text, and that the interesting work 
only begins at that point. 
 This kind of reasoning may be naive and simplistic, it is not completely foolish. It 
becomes worrisome when the disinclination to occupy oneself with the details of texts 
takes such strong forms that people feel they can do without it. For some reason or other 
they may think that even the most superficial reading of a text is enough for them to 
know what it really is about, and that all that is really worth knowing about the text can 
be obtained in this way. 
 All this may sound somewhat theoretical. It becomes real when one comes across 
a case where a text one has written oneself is being treated in this manner. This has 
happened to me, and this note is meant to reflect upon this case. Let me present it. 
 A recent article in the Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft1 
reviews a volume which I edited some years ago.2 The reviewer does not deal with any of 
the contributions except those by Frits Staal and myself. Since Professor Staal is more 
than capable of looking after himself, I will concentrate on the part that concerns my own 
two contributions. This part credits me with a number of views and attitudes, among 
them the following. I have “an almost messianic view of the West, which is considered 
the source of rational inquiry (supposedly the yardstick of every possible form of 
thought), and also the place where it culminated historically in modern science” (p. 191). 
I appear to have taken “the decision ... to approach Asiatic thought by considering it 
within the category of rationality, and more specifically that critical rational thought that 
distinguishes Western science” (p. 193). Questions are used on that same page as a device 
to impute to me the view that Indian and Chinese thought only merit being known and 
remembered insofar as they conform to the scientific outlook, that what is not 
conformable to scientific thought can be forgotten as it is simply irrational and hence 
useless. On p. 194 I learn that I assume “that our own world is the only sensible and 
                                                   
1 “Some questions posed by a recent epistemological approach to Indian thought,” ZDMG 155(1), 
2005, 189-197. 
2 Johannes Bronkhorst (ed.), La rationalité en Asie / Rationality in Asia. Études de Lettres 
(Lausanne) 2001, 3. 
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desirable one”. 
 I plead complete innocence with regard to all of these accusations. Nothing in the 
articles reviewed, and nothing in any of my other publications says anything of the kind. 
Quite the contrary! All the ideas imputed to me are so far from any of my own, that I 
cannot but conclude that the reviewer is fighting windmills. As I read his text, I learn that 
he is passionately committed to criticizing certain views, which he calls “neopositivist”, 
but which no one seems to hold. In need of a guilty party, I have had the bad luck of 
being chosen as victim. Having put me in the guilty corner, the reviewer does not waste 
time trying to find out which were my real concerns in writing these articles, and in what 
way they might contribute to the problems that face historians of Indian thought.  
No real defence against imputations of the kind outlined above is possible. One 
can only hope that readers (for I believe they still exist) will not be taken in by this 
review, and will rather turn to the reviewed texts. One wonders, however, how someone 
who reads the works of his colleagues so badly will deal with Indian texts. 
 Much of the review is filled with a discussion of the work of a number of modern 
Western philosophers (Gadamer, Heidegger, Feyerabend, and others). Inevitably, its 
level of abstraction is high throughout, and little is said about the precise interpretations 
of specific Indian texts. However, there are some remarks of that nature, some of which 
concern the interpretation of the early Indian philosopher Nāgārjuna, which I propose to 
consider in some detail. We read here (p. 197): 
 
the philosophical question that [Nāgārjuna seems] to tackle is very reminiscent of 
a well-known problem in Western philosophy, and particularly in 
phenomenology: it is certainly an ordinary and general experience, though not an 
original one, that there is a subject who is confronted with objects; this experience 
consists, rather, in a secondary outcome that tends to become absolute and that is 
merely the result of a process of abstraction; if, therefore, we lose the original 
immediacy because of a tendency to abstract, the task of philosophy, which in its 
turn consists in abstracting, will be to think contrary to and beyond its own 
vocation to abstract and deviate from the original experience. This is why 
Nāgārjuna ... constantly [seeks] to lead thought into an impasse: [he rejects] the 
evidence of generation, of the cause-effect relation etc. Here thought is required to 
checkmate itself, to think the unthinkable, more or less as in Heidegger’s late 
work. 
 
Those who have read Nāgārjuna know that this passage is neither a translation of his 
words, nor indeed a close paraphrase of them. It is a European interpretation which is due 
to reading European philosophers, but which is not necessarily based on a close reading 
of Nāgārjuna. As a matter of fact, close reading of Nāgārjuna might well lead to 
something different altogether. If Nāgārjuna succeeds in leading thought into an impasse, 
as our reviewer maintains, it is because he reasons on the basis of one or more implied 
presuppositions. I have tried to identify one of these presuppositions, and have come up 
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with the following: “les mots d’un énoncé correspondent un à un aux choses qui 
constituent la situation décrite par l’énoncé” ("the words of a statement correspond, one 
by one, to the things that constitute the situation described by that statement"). I think that 
this presupposition makes sense of many of Nāgārjuna’s reasonings, but I know that 
other scholars (e.g. Claus Oetke) may prefer a different formulation. The review under 
consideration cites my proposal (as above, in French), and rejects it as due to my 
“epistemological neopositivist approach”; I assume that alternative proposals would fare 
no better. Which leaves me with the question: has our reviewer ever seriously occupied 
himself with any of Nāgārjuna’s works, or even one of them? Has he ever really tried to 
understand any of the stanzas of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā? Or does his philosophy not 
allow him to try to understand a text on such a down-to-earth level? Does he already 
know what Nāgārjuna is all about because “of a well-known problem in Western 
philosophy, and particularly in phenomenology”?  
 Let us consider a concrete example, viz., verse 7.17 of Nāgārjuna’s 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā: 
 
yadi kaścid anutpanno bhāvaḥ saṃvidyate kvacit/ utpadyeta sa kiṃ tasmin bhāve 
utpadyate 'sati// 
If something exists somewhere that has not come into being, it might come into 
being. Since that thing does not exist, what comes into being? 
 
I take it that verses like this lead the thought of our reviewer into an impasse, that they 
require his thought to checkmate itself, and that they make him think the unthinkable. But 
there is no need for melodrama. A more measured response would be to point out that the 
logical force of this verse is nil, so that we are entitled to discard what seems to be its 
implied conclusion (“nothing comes into being”) without further ado. It would, however, 
be more generous toward Nāgārjuna to consider the possibility that he (and many of his 
Indian readers) held one or more presuppositions which made the verse logically 
coherent to them. And there we are back at the “epistemological neopositivist approach”. 
If our reviewer does not like this, he may be urged to explain how he makes sense of 
individual portions and arguments in Nāgārjuna’s works. So far he has given no hint that 
he has even tried to, except of course through global and unhelpful comparisons with 
some modern Western philosophers. 
 
I have had the sad experience of being forced into a (mental) box in which I do not fit. I 
fear that Nāgārjuna, and perhaps other Indian thinkers with him, would be as bewildered 
as I am, if not more so, if they found out what our reviewer has made of their thought. All 
I can hope is that other researchers in the field will succeed in finding more time to read 
in depth the texts which they are supposed to study. The review article here considered 
seems to me a good example of how not to proceed. 
